Few moments in modern statecraft are as telling as when a government quietly walks back its own ambitions. Saudi Arabia has yet to say anything of the sort in public, but the steady contraction of its flagship construction programme tells the story clearly enough. The Kingdom’s Giga-Projects, once positioned as proof that the future could be built by sheer force of will, are being reconsidered.
Take “The Line,” for instance. It used to be the flagship project within NEOM. Lately, plans have shifted so much that they barely resemble the original vision. A short time back, such changes wouldn’t have made news at all. Now, though, even small tweaks draw attention.
The appointment of Fahad Al-Saif as Minister of Investment in February 2026 is one signal of that shift. He is a product of debt markets and global capital finance, not the energy establishment, and his arrival in place of the long-serving Khalid Al-Falih points to a change in priorities behind the scenes.
And the appointment couldn’t have come at a better time. On one hand, Saudi Arabia is having a hard financial reset of its Vision 2030 priorities, and on the other hand, it needs global backing as well, in the form of investments and deep partnerships. Al-Saif already had a fruitful tenure at the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF), where he helped shape the Kingdom’s overarching investment strategy and led global investment financing.
With deep experience in domains like capital structuring, market and sustainability strategies, and managing relationships with financial institutions and investors, Al-Saif will be expected to usher the Gulf major’s Ministry of Investment into a new phase defined by integrating strategic planning with smart financing to support diversification efforts.
Al-Saif will be replacing the veteran technocrat Khalid Al-Falih, the former Energy Minister and ex-CEO of Aramco, whose diplomatic efforts put the Kingdom on the global investment map. Still, FDI inflows reportedly lagged. In 2024, the ratio stood at some USD 32 billion in 2024, well short of the USD 100 billion annual target set for 2030. Al-Saif will have an immediate challenge on hand: helping the Investment Ministry to fulfil/near the target of completing USD 46 bn in inflows in 2026, followed by USD 58 billion in 2027.
Simultaneously, there are challenges like financing structures, public-private partnership models, and credit guarantees that can make the task of pulling off complex FDI deals still a tricky task. Here, the Kingdom will likely depend upon Al-Saif’s experience, as the Gulf major looks for better financial structuring to de-risk entry for foreign capital.
Al-Saif was also the same person who founded the National Debt Management Centre (NDMC) at the Finance Ministry, effectively building the Kingdom’s sovereign debt issuance programme from scratch. Also, his previous stints as Head of Global Capital Finance and Head of Investment Strategy will keep him better aware of the investment vehicle’s accounts, especially as both the Kingdom and the Fund are about to unveil their new five-year investment and diversification strategies, reportedly focusing on high-return sectors while pivoting away from heavy construction projects.
Reality Kicks In
Attention-grabbing comes fast when deals spark chatter, yet lasting trust among serious investors does not arrive overnight. The broader story of how Saudi Arabia arrived at this moment is one of extraordinary ambition meeting ordinary constraint.
What began as an extraordinary idea stands out in every way possible. Near the end of the decade, Saudi Arabia launched a string of massive initiatives, a glassy straight line of city, stretching 170 km across the desert northwest, reaching more than half a kilometre high; within mountains, a ski resort shaped by nature; above water, floating ports taking shape; then, one tower so enormous it could be spotted from space. Those polished booklets held grand visions, momentum felt unbreakable, while talk of fresh urban life revolved around speed and scale.
That message has since been revised. Recent satellite photography reveals a long, cleared channel in the desert with little else to show for years of development. The Kingdom’s government has now acknowledged that rather than completing the full linear structure, efforts will concentrate on a much smaller coastal stretch known as Hidden Marina. The scale of the retreat is significant.
The rhetoric coming from officials has also undergone a quiet transformation. Phrases that once invoked civilisational reinvention have given way to the more measured language of strategic sequencing and development phases. As for what “The Line” might eventually look like, speculation points toward something far more utilitarian. It is probably going to be turned into digital infrastructure, data processing facilities and connectivity networks, rather than the levitating gardens and autonomous transit systems featured in early concept videos.
The Line is not the only casualty of this recalibration. Several other projects across the Kingdom have been deferred or deprioritised. The Mukaab, a vast cube-shaped development intended for central Riyadh, has been put aside. Proposals for highland developments in the country’s north are being reassessed. Now shaping plans differently, the PIF appears to adjust its approach toward sectors delivering steadier short-term gains, such as mining leads alongside advanced manufacturing, logistics, and artificial intelligence (AI). A twist comes with the 2034 FIFA World Cup, scheduled for Saudi Arabia’s hosting. That event looms ahead.
Delivering the infrastructure required for a tournament of that scale is now a concrete deadline shaping how resources are allocated. Somewhat remarkably, plans still exist to construct one of the tournament’s stadiums as part of The Line’s structure.
The details strain credibility given how little of the underlying city has been built, but the persistence of the idea captures something essential about how Saudi Arabia continues to operate even in a period of restraint.
None of this should obscure the genuine progress that “Vision 2030” has produced. The social changes have been real and wide-reaching. The entertainment sector has expanded dramatically. More women are working than at any point in the Kingdom’s history. The share of the economy not dependent on oil revenues has grown at a pace that surprised many analysts. These are not trivial achievements.
The problem was that the megaprojects, whatever their original intent, evolved into something closer to performance. They functioned as a signal to the outside world that transformation was already underway and irreversible, rather than as practical tools for achieving it. In doing so, they raised expectations that the underlying economics could never fully support.
Global construction costs have risen sharply. The oil windfall that once seemed to make anything possible has its limits. And the international investors who were once captivated by the ambition of it all are now pressing for specifics on profitability and oversight.
Out of everything coming together, there is a nation shifting while we watch. Far off, those cranes still stand, yet hopes remain. Still, the idea that chasing big dreams is enough, without tending to real markets or liveable towns, now seems less viable. Saudi Arabia might find true progress not in bold displays, but in matching drive to practical effort when it matters most.