Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” reform programme aims for a diversified economy, reflecting the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The strategy seeks to build a strong private sector, lessen the Kingdom’s oil reliance, and create a lively community.
While certain parts of the plan—especially those headed by the strong Public Investment Fund (PIF)—have shown clear improvement, others seem to be lagging or struggling to reach stated goals. This unequal growth raises important questions regarding the inclusion and sustainability of the “Vision 2030” path.
PIF: The Star Performer
Rising above its financial and operational expectations far ahead of time, the PIF has become Saudi Arabia’s spearhead for reform. The sovereign wealth fund, originally projected to attain USD 1 trillion in assets by 2025, had achieved that target by the end of 2023.
It has actively made investments in global digital companies, green energy startups, entertainment, and sports—including well-publicised actions such as its ownership in Lucid Motors, acquisitions in esports, and the dubious LIV Golf circuit.
Domestically, PIF has spurred big initiatives such as the USD 500 billion smart metropolis NEOM, the Red Sea tourism project, and Qiddiya, the entertainment city close to Riyadh. These mega-projects aim to generate employment opportunities, attract foreign investment, and enhance Saudi Arabia’s international standing. PIF has avoided conventional bureaucratic obstacles by directly funding and running these projects; therefore, it assumes a parallel state within a state.
Unlike the slow rate of transformation in other government sectors, the success of the fund reflects its direct access to state resources, political support, and simplified decision-making process.
Social Liberalisation And Private Sector Development
Though the PIF has shown extraordinary accomplishment, other Vision 2030 areas have lagged. Raising the private sector’s GDP contribution from 40% to 65% by 2030 was one of the main objectives. This number swings about 45% as of 2024; many small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) struggle with regulations, restricted credit availability, and an erratic business environment.
Despite the government’s progress in streamlining company registration and issuing licenses, red tape and favouritism persist. The domestic private sector also relies heavily on public sector contracts, which limits natural entrepreneurship. Furthermore, another important statistic, foreign direct investment (FDI), has not met its targets. Though mega-projects have drawn attention-grabbing offers, more general FDI flows still vary.
Another pillar of Vision 2030, social liberalisation, has had mixed outcomes. Saudi women can drive, go to sporting events, and pursue hitherto male-dominated professions today.
Deeper institutional changes remain partial and sometimes cosmetic, such as guaranteeing equal legal rights, changing guardianship rules, and encouraging female political participation. Even among reformers, crackdowns on the opposition have also clouded the genuineness and viability of liberalising initiatives.
Workforce, Education, And Human Capital Bottlenecks
Saudi Vision 2030’s achievement depends on human capital development, yet difficulties still exist here. Limited progress has come from initiatives to improve the educational system and match it with market needs. Many university graduates—especially women and humanities graduates—still find themselves underemployed or unemployed.
Though scholarship reforms and vocational training programmes are under development, a societal movement toward appreciating non-traditional professional options is still young.
Furthermore, even if Saudization programmes seek to lessen the Kingdom’s dependence on foreign labour, many companies lament the lack of preparedness and skill gap among native talent.
Governmental And Execution Risk
The concentration of power around a small number of institutions—mostly the PIF—also raises other questions. Although such an arrangement has allowed major projects to be rapidly implemented, it also runs the danger of producing a skewed development model that avoids more general institutional improvement. Long-term influence depends on good government, openness, and responsibility systems—all of which many communities still lack.
Furthermore, several major projects are experiencing delays in execution and growing expenses, casting doubt on timetables and profitability. NEOM has already halted some stages of its implementation, for instance, and detractors wonder if the aims for employment and population growth are reasonable.
A Story Of Two Visions
As “Vision 2030” approaches its halfway point, it becomes evident that the PIF’s achievements do not accurately portray the entire reform landscape. Though its disproportionate influence highlights a basic conflict: the concentration of power and performance in a single organisation while other structural reforms lag; the fund has been a wonderful vehicle for investment and image-building.
If Saudi Arabia is to fulfil its promise of a diversified, inclusive, and resilient economy, it must intensify institutional change, invest in human resources, assist SMEs beyond mere lip service, and embrace openness. Otherwise, “Vision 2030” runs the danger of becoming a two-speed transformation, one pushed by top-down capital deployment and another battling grassroots inertia.
The real test over the next five years will not just be about finishing megaprojects but also whether the Kingdom can create an ecosystem where entrepreneurship, innovation, and inclusivity can flourish free from constant reliance on the big resources of the state.